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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study is to find out how different sectors of the market, as defined by the 
Bloomberg Industry Classification Standard (BICS), react before and after different natural 
disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes and tornados. Public cross sectional and time series data 
from NOAA, Unisys Weather, and the USGS were collected, in order to build a data set that could 
be used for this study. OLS regressions, as well as fixed effects regressions were used to achieve 
the results. Among the major findings is a highly significant upward reaction in the returns of the 
energy sector when property damage from a tornado occurs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Do stock prices get affected by natural disasters? This is a question that has recently 
started to be studied more in academic literature, but one that still needs further exploration since 
it could have important trading implications as natural disasters –hurricanes, tornados, and 
earthquakes– are natural phenomena that occur on a repeated basis. Does the overall financial 
market proxied by S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial Average get affected uniformly or do 
different sectors within the financial markets such as financials, materials, utilities, technology, 
health care, energy, consumer staples, and consumer discretionary show different reactions to 
such events? While several studies to date have looked at the overall financial market reaction to 
disasters, this study, to our knowledge, is the first to conduct a systematic analysis of the reaction 
of all available individual sectors to natural disasters and attempts to find whether a long, short, 
or a combination strategy generates positive returns. 
The goal of this study is to come up with a model, or at the very least some rules to use 
in case of natural disasters, to mitigate financial losses for individuals. The study uses historical 
sector price data of the week an event occurs to assess the price reaction to the event. It further 
uses historical sector price data over a longer term to see what type of price trends occur after the 
natural disaster. If there are observable price trends for the overall market or for some sectors 
within the market, perhaps they can be turned into trading strategies that will yield positive 
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returns. These strategies could then be used by individuals that live in natural disaster-prone 
areas and thus are susceptible to losses in the case of natural disasters as well as companies such 
as insurers, that would be adversely affected by natural disasters as financial tools that would 
help them hedge their exposure to natural disasters. 
 Major objectives of this project were to come up with a working model using a dataset 
that includes weekly returns by sector, compared to different natural disasters occurring per week 
and hopefully coming up with the effect of said natural disasters on returns. This paper collects 
twenty-eight years of weekly returns in the different sectors of the market, as well as data of 
twenty-eight years of hurricanes per week, and earthquakes per week. Along with tornados per 
week, the damage attributed to each tornado is also collected. All the data is for disasters that 
happened on the continental United States. Recently researchers have started paying attention to 
this topic especially since the occurrence of natural disasters has increased as climate change 
takes effect on our world. For example, Koerniadi, et. al. (2012) find evidence suggesting 
earthquakes, hurricanes and tornados could negatively affect market returns several weeks after 
the events, while other disasters such as flood, tsunami and volcanic eruption may have limited 
impact on market returns.   
 The major contribution of this paper to the existing literature is a detailed look at 
twenty-eight years of weekly disaster data and its effect on stock markets not only in the 
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aggregate but also on a sector basis. This paper’s major findings include a confirmation of a 
negative effect on the cumulative stock market, when a catastrophe has occurred with high 
statistical significance. Furthermore, it confirms that returns for the market as whole go down 
when Property Damage from a tornado occurs. But when broken down by sector, this same 
Property Damage has a positive effect on the returns of the energy sector, and it is highly 
statistically significant. Other significant findings when broken down by sector are, that the 
returns of the DOW Jones Industrial Average and the Industrial sector are both affected 
negatively when a catastrophe transpires. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Several studies show there is a correlation between asset prices and natural disasters. [Barro 
(2009), Koerniadi, et. al. (2012), Nakamura (2013), Seetharam (2017)] They investigate the 
extent of the decline before and immediately after a disaster, and the length of time a recovery 
takes to develop. This paper builds on their work in setting the parameters for the dataset and 
their analysis.  
 Barro (2009), Koerniadi, et. al. (2012), and Nakamura (2013) focus on large scale disasters 
such as World Wars and Pandemics. They attempt to come up with a risk premium in order to 
make up for the potential loss during these great disasters. Nakamura (2013) finds a rather large 
value for their risk premium and reports: “Our model generates a sizable equity premium from 
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disaster risk, but one that is substantially smaller than in simpler models. It implies that a large 
value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is necessary to explain stock-market crashes 
at the onset of disasters.” [Nakamura (2013)]. The data for this study comes from an annual 
consumption dataset created by Barro and Ursua (2008) which includes 100 years of data from 
24 different countries. Nakamura (2013) uses the Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) methods 
to conduct the empirical analysis. The goal of the study was to judge the size of the shocks 
during a disaster period, as well as the extent of recovery after disasters. Although this study 
focuses on disasters that from peak to trough last about 6 years; it also tests if a disaster started 
and ended immediately. The findings are that equities fare extremely poorly relative to bonds at 
times of a disaster, and this behavior generates a large equity premium in normal times. 
[Nakamura (2013)]. This disaster effect coincides with the hypothesis of this paper that natural 
disasters will have a negative effect on stock returns. In comparison to these long-term disasters, 
however, weather catastrophes occur and end pretty much as soon as they begin. 
  In his “Rare Disasters, Asset Prices, and Welfare Costs” article published in the American 
Economic Review, Barro (2009) builds on his previous work with a data set that considers 60 
events for 35 countries over 100 years. It adds more parameters to account for asset pricing in 
different economies. This study also focuses on large economic disasters; but Barro notes: “In 
contrast, the probability parameter p and size parameter b refer to major economic disasters, 
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such as those that occurred in many countries during World Wars I and II and the Great 
Depression. … To go further, decreases in p or b constitute reductions in the probability or size 
of disasters not yet seen or, at least, not seen in the 20th century. Included here would be nuclear 
conflicts, large scale natural disasters (tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, asteroid collisions), 
and epidemics of disease (Black Death, avian flu).” [Barro (2009)]. When we apply these results 
to weather related disasters, we can conclude that the welfare costs of disaster risk will lower 
GDP, therefore the perception of a disaster can create the fear that the stock market will drop 
because of the forward-looking decline in aggregate consumption, making the analysis in this 
paper relevant. 
 In “Natural disasters – Blessings in disguise?” Koerniadi, et. al. (2012) examine the impact 
of natural disasters on market returns and on several industries. The authors indicate the reason 
for their study as the prediction by Oxford University researchers that natural disasters will 
increase in the coming decade due to global warming. The study includes earthquakes, 
hurricanes, tornados, floods, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions, that occurred in numerous 
countries with developed stock markets. They study how these events affect market returns and 
the returns of several industries, expected to be most affected in a negative or positive manner. 
They find that natural disasters do in fact have a negative effect on certain sectors and industries. 
The setup of Koerniadi, et. al. (2012) is the most similar to this research paper. Where they differ 
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is that the focus of this study is only on US based catastrophes and markets, and Koerniadi, et. al. 
(2012) does not include macroeconomic control variables, such as CPI or GDP. They do find that 
market returns react negatively to earthquakes, hurricanes and tornados which is in line with the 
questions and expectations of this paper.  
 Seetharam (2017) describes the impact of 122 major catastrophic events, on publicly listed 
companies that were geographically affected by these events. The study compares the returns of 
exposed companies to non-exposed companies, using a standard cross-sectional event study 
methodology. Another question Seetharam (2017) attempts to answer is whether the impact to 
exposed companies is worse on multi-plant firms vs. single-plant firms. The findings include: 
“The estimates suggest a sizable decline in the value of exposed firms relative to nonexposed 
firms. The immediate effect … is small and only significant at the 10% level, but the effect in 
longer horizons are all larger and significant at the 1% level.” The study estimates the fall in 
market valuation to be 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points in the 15-day horizon and the 45-day 
horizon, respectively. The adverse impact is found to be mainly centered on single-plant 
standalone firms and multi-plant firms seem to retain their adaptive capacity to counter the 
adverse costs of extreme weather. The results of this study are very relevant to this study because 
it has similar findings of negative effects from catastrophes on market returns or company 
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valuations while using a cross-sectional event study methodology as opposed to the fixed effects 
OLS method used here.  
THEORY AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 
 The theory in this paper is that when natural disasters occur, there will be a measurable 
negative effect on weekly returns in most sectors and market indices. The findings here are 
similar to those in Koerniadi, et. al. (2012): “We find that different natural disasters have 
different impacts on the returns of the market and on those of industries. Our evidence suggests 
that while earthquake, hurricane and tornado could negatively affect market returns several 
weeks after the events, other disasters such as flood, tsunami and volcanic eruption may have 
limited impact on market returns”. Furthermore, these disasters could potentially have a positive 
effect on other sectors.  
 Unlike Koerniadi, et. al. (2012) the data for this study is controlled for inflation, 
unemployment, GDP, the purchasing managers index, and mortgage applications, to help show 
the isolated effects on returns caused by catastrophes and property damage. This paper 
hypothesizes that, if a natural disaster occurs, there will be a quantifiable effect on weekly 
returns. 
Hypothesis Independent 
Variable 
β Expected 
Sign  
Theory/Existing Findings 
H1 Returns β1 β1 < 0 Natural disasters will have a negative effect 
on weekly financial market returns (Y). 
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DATA 
 This paper uses financial and economic data obtained from the Bloomberg terminals in the 
Rhode Island College Finance Lab. It contains twenty-eight years of weekly price data starting in 
January 1990 and going through April 2018, for the overall market indices Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA), Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500), Nasdaq Composite, and Russell 2000, as 
well as the following nine sectors: Materials, Industrials, Technology, Health Care, Consumer 
Staples, Consumer Discretionary, Energy, Financials, Utilities. Once this data was collected the 
price information was used to calculate the returns per week for the 28 years of data which left 
1,456 observations for each sector and market index, or 18,928 total return observations.  
 Hurricane data was taken from the Unisys Weather website1. The data was broken down by 
week and category for each hurricane that occurred in the past twenty-eight years were provided. 
The earthquake data was found on the United States Geological Survey (USGS) website2 where 
it was listed by date. The tornado information along with the property damage data contained in 
this paper was acquired from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
website3. Dummy variables were used to designate if there was an event that week (1) or not (0). 
                                               
1 https://www.unisys.com/industries/government/unisys-federal/unisys-weather  
2 https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/earthq4/severitygip.html  
3 https://www.nssl.noaa.gov/education/svrwx101/tornadoes/  
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 The data for natural disasters was collected starting with tornados greater than EF-3 on the 
Enhanced Fujita Scale4, which includes tornados with wind speeds of 136 mph or higher. EF-3 
damage is considered severe, and roofs, heavy cars, trees and structures with weak foundations 
will be blown away some distance with the damage increasing with each category up to EF-5 
where winds exceed 200 mph. The property damage in millions of dollars accredited to each 
tornado was also recorded when this value was higher than $2.5 million. Moving onto 
hurricanes, data for those greater than category 3 were collected. These hurricanes have wind 
speeds higher than 111 mph. According to the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale which is 
used by NOAA, “hurricanes reaching category 3 or higher are considered major hurricanes 
because of their potential for significant loss of life and damage.5” Finally, earthquakes greater 
than 4 on the Richter scale were added to the data set. According to the USGS, earthquakes of 
magnitude 4 and higher are felt by people and some damage can occur. 
  The economic data collected from the Bloomberg terminal were the top-rated market 
indicators by analysts in Bloomberg, which were mortgage applications and the Purchasing 
Managers Index. Also, the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website6 was used to collect 
twenty-eight years of monthly data for CPI, real GDP, and the Unemployment Rate. These 
                                               
4 https://weather.com/storms/tornado/news/enhanced-fujita-scale-20130206  
5 https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php  
6 https://fred.stlouisfed.org  
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macroeconomic indicators were selected due to the extensive research that shows these 
fundamental variables to have power in predicting stock returns. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) find 
that changes in aggregate production, inflation, and the short-term interest rates are among the 
macroeconomic factors that have some power to predict stock returns and they conclude that 
expected returns are a function of business conditions. The unemployment rate, also followed 
closely by the federal reserve, was selected as a barometer of economic activity proxying for the 
health of the current economy. 
 In total the dataset contains 29,120 different datapoints which are observations of the 
same entities per week, year over year, for twenty-eight years. This makes it a cross-sectional 
panel-data, so regression methods were adjusted as such. The dependent variables used in the 
empirical model are the returns of the indexes and the sectors used (Y). After some data analysis, 
the individual dummy variables of Hurricanes, Tornados and Earthquakes were found not to be 
statistically significant on their own. Subsequently, they were combined to create a consolidated 
variable called Catastrophe which did show statistical significance when it came to predicting 
market returns. The independent variables used in the study include this new Catastrophe dummy 
variable ranging from 0 to 3 (X1), Consumer Price Index or CPI (X2), Unemployment Rate (X3), 
Gross Domestic Product or GDP (X4), Purchasing Managers Index or PMI (X5), Mortgage 
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Applications (X6), and Property Damage (X7). CPI, Unemployment Rate, GDP, PMI, and 
Mortgage Applications are used as control variables. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Table 1 shows all the variables in this study listed with their Mean, Standard Deviation, 
Minimum, Maximum, Standard Error, and Variance. The relevant variables are the independent 
variables: catastrophes and the property damage. The dependent variables are the sector and 
market index returns. This is because the project is about the effect of the catastrophes on returns 
as time goes by. CPI, Unemployment Rate, GDP, PMI, and Mortgage Applications are in the 
model as control variables because it is obvious that returns do not solely depend on 
catastrophes. In order to have the model explain more of the change in returns, the control 
variables were added. 
 Table 2, Panels A through M present the correlation matrices for the variables for each 
index or sector. The sector with the highest weekly return for the last twenty-eight years was the 
Technology sector with a 0.25% weekly return, with the second highest return being the 
NASDAQ at 0.23%. This makes sense considering the NASDAQ index is heavily weighted in 
the Technology sector. The sector with lowest weekly return for the last twenty-eight years was 
the Utilities sector with 0.09% weekly return. Another interesting finding is that the mean for 
Property Damage caused by a tornado is $22.69 million. 
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 Additionally, in the various panels of Table 2 it was found that the control variables were 
not correlated with each other, so they could be used in the model. The sector with the highest 
correlation to catastrophe was Industrials, and the index with the highest correlation to 
catastrophe was the Dow Jones. The Dow Jones and the Industrials sector have a positive 
correlation of 0.914. The sector with the highest correlation to property damage was energy at 
0.034, which is unexpected because this implies that when a tornado causes property damage, the 
energy sector returns go up.  
EMPIRICAL METHODS 
 This paper uses empirical analysis with the standard linear regression model using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS). 
Yi = α + X1i β1 + X2i β2 + X3i β3 + X4i β4 + X5i β5 + X6i β6 + X7i β7 + εi 
where Yi denotes the dependent variable implying weekly Returns, Xi is a 7x1 vector of weekly 
explanatory variables, β is 7x1 vector of unknown parameters, and εi is an error term. 
Explanatory variables (Xi) include: (1) Catastrophe; (2) CPI; (3) Unemployment Rate, (4) GDP, 
(5) PMI, (6) Mortgage Applications, and (7) Property Damage.  
 To control for potential heteroskedasticity in the dataset, OLS with white 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error was ran on the dataset. 
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 The last model used was the Entity Fixed Effects Regression Model. This is because the 
data contains omitted variables that change from sector to sector which could affect Returns in a 
quantifiable way. 
Yi = α + X1i β1 + X2i β2 + X3i β3 + X4i β4 + X5i β5 + X6i β6 + X7i β7 + D1i+… + D12i + εi 
where Yi denotes the dependent variable implying weekly Returns, Xi is a 7x1 vector of 
explanatory variables, β is a 7x1 vector of unknown parameters, and εi is an error term. 
Explanatory variables (Xi) include: (1) Catastrophe; (2) CPI; (3) Unemployment Rate, (4) GDP, 
(5) PMI, (6) Mortgage Applications, and (7) Property Damage. Dummy variables D1 through D12 
are the entities or sectors used to control for unobservable variables (or characteristics) that vary 
from one entity to another but do not change over time. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 We first examine the relationship of the weekly returns of market indices and S&P 500 
sectors, to weather catastrophes through a fixed effects regression. The estimated model, 
presented in Table 3, is: 
Yi = -0.148 - 0.067x1 -.063x2 + .019x3 + 0.019x4 + 0.007x5 - 0.008x6 + 0.0001x7 
where Yi is the weekly S&P500 index returns, and x1 through x7 are the explanatory variables of 
catastrophe, consumer price index, unemployment rate, gross domestic product, purchasing 
managers index, mortgage applications, and property damage, respectively. 
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 Using the data with particular attention to how catastrophes affect returns, an empirical 
analysis is performed and this model is created. The results outlined in Table 3 show that there is 
in fact heteroskedasticity in the dataset, because when the OLS was run with the white 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the standard errors in the regressions went down 
significantly. The next finding from Table 3 is that Catastrophes do have an effect on Returns. 
According to the coefficient of Catastrophe, for every unit catastrophe increases, weekly returns 
decrease by 6.7%, with a statistical significance level of 5%. This confirms this paper’s 
hypothesis of catastrophes having a negative effect on returns. On Table 3 Property Damage also 
has a negative effect on returns: when property damage goes up by 1 unit ($1 million), weekly 
returns go down by 0.02%, at the 1% significance level. Most of the control variables also 
influence returns as expected and CPI, GDP and Mortgage Applications are found to be 
statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The entity fixed effects model was confirmed to 
be useful in this case because R2 increased from .033 to .036 when the entity fixed effect was 
included. 
 Table 4 contains the regressions ran for each index or sector returns while controlling for 
heteroskedasticity. In order to narrow down which sector had the lowest p-value, the models 
were run by sector because there was a highly significant coefficient for catastrophe. The 
Industrials sector (Table 4 – Panel L) had the second lowest p-value and according to column 4 
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the returns go down by 1.4% every time catastrophe increases by 1 unit, at a statistical 
significance level of 15%. Industrials also had the highest negative correlation with catastrophe 
out of all the other sectors. The p-value for the Dow Jones (Table 4 – Panel A) was even lower 
just above the 10% level of significance at 0.105. 
 One more interesting discovery is that the variable Property Damage has highly significant 
results for the energy sector on Table 4 – Panel G. For every unit that Property Damage goes up, 
energy sector returns go up by .01%, at the 5% level of significance. These findings are very 
exciting because they offer a clue on which way to continue this research. Diaz de Gracia (2016) 
investigate the impact of oil prices on stock returns from January 1974 to December 2015 and 
find that in the short run a significant positive impact to oil prices is beneficial to energy stock 
prices. They also find that this relationship becomes statistically significant after 1986. [Liu, et. 
al. (2017)]. This could explain why the Energy sector returns increase when there is property 
damage from a tornado, because when infrastructure and pipelines are damaged this can cause a 
contraction in the oil supply which in the short term leads to an increase in the price of oil and 
therefore, leading to an increase in Energy sector prices. We leave investigating the long-term 
effects of this on Energy sector prices to a future study. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
  When large scale external shocks occur, stock markets are expected to be affected in 
different ways depending on the index or industry. The worse the disaster (and the more 
unexpected it is) the higher the stock market reaction is expected to be. This study finds that 
there is in fact a negative relationship between catastrophes and returns, with high statistical 
significance which is consistent with the literature that has been compiled by academia. 
According to the findings, when a catastrophe happens, returns go down but historically not by 
much. This can be attributed to the sheer size of the financial markets, especially in the US 
where NYSE alone trades at a daily volume of $169 billion. “The costliest natural catastrophe 
recorded to date is the 2005 landfall of Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, with an estimated 
destructive cost of around $150 billion, of which $62 billion was covered by the insurance 
industry. This is less than a single percentage point of movement on the New York Stock 
Exchange.” [Mahalingam, et. al. (2018)]. As the global economy becomes more intertwined, and 
weather disasters become more destructive, we would expect the costs to keep increasing making 
the negative effects greater on financial markets as time goes on. 
 Market indices and Industries were also tested against catastrophes, and the Dow Jones and 
Industrials sector had the highest statistical significance in this test at 15% and 10.5%, 
respectively. One explanation for this is that when catastrophes ensue, the destruction of property 
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take its toll on these industries, such as Airlines, Air freight, Road and Rail, and Transportation 
Infrastructure. The price of oil can be pushed up when a catastrophe transpires, which directly 
hurts the industries just mentioned because it makes their cost to operate more expensive. This 
cost increase compiled with the capital investment necessary to fix whatever broke after a 
catastrophe, can drive investors to sell off the Industrials as soon as bad weather hits. Since the 
Dow Jones is heavily weighted with Industrials, and since it has a very high correlation with it, 
these effects show up in both asset classes. 
 The highest statistical significance of the explanatory variables to any sector is the positive 
relationship between the Property Damage variable to the energy sector. “The oil and gas 
industry has been favoured by investors in recent years due to the increasing oil prices during 
the period between 2008 and 2014. The number of mutual funds and exchange traded funds that 
invest in oil and gas industry companies also increased during this period.” [Ramos and Veiga 
(2011)]. This positive relationship between oil prices and asset prices explains the positive 
coefficient generated for property damage. A more counterintuitive argument is that due to the 
destruction of property, capital investments will follow, some paid for by insurances. This would 
lead to upgraded infrastructure at a lower cost than if they paid for it without the insurance 
payout. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Future research should include more controlled variables, and new variables like P/E ratios, 
Return on Equity, Risk free rate, 10-year T-bill rate, WTI Oil price and the Price to dividend 
ratio. This would be important in order to continue to increase the R-squared for this model. 
Expanding this research can lead to a pathway for investing during different types of events that 
are unexpected and affect returns. 
 The next step to further this research would be to perform an event study as in Ruiz, et. al. 
(2014). “These studies are useful because the event’s effect is immediately reflected in stock 
prices (Fama, et al., 1969). Therefore, a measure of the economic impact of the event can be 
easily developed using the observed prices of securities over a short period of time.” [Ruiz, et. 
al. (2014)]. There could be several event studies performed, one using the returns of when the 
largest Property Damages recorded happen. Another study that can be done is to come up with a 
predictions for the timing of catastrophes (for example using time series analysis or even 
artificial intelligence or neural networks) and then investigate in the event study the months 
when catastrophes are abnormally high or low compared to the predictions, to see if the 
contemporaneous or subsequent returns are also abnormally high or low. 
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
All Samples 
n=1,456 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Std. 
Err. Variance 
Dow Jones 0.174 2.189 -18.151 11.291 0.057 4.792 
S&P 500 0.164 2.235 -18.196 12.025 0.058 4.997 
Nasdaq 0.232 3.014 -25.304 18.978 0.078 9.089 
Russell 0.189 2.764 -16.400 16.382 0.072 7.641 
Materials 0.149 2.925 -15.329 15.159 0.076 8.557 
Industrials 0.179 2.599 -17.413 12.422 0.068 6.753 
Technology 0.252 3.440 -21.490 15.700 0.090 11.843 
Healthcare 0.206 2.409 -18.425 9.583 0.063 5.806 
Cons Stap 0.174 1.972 -15.940 10.979 0.052 3.890 
Cons Disc 0.200 2.682 -18.283 17.064 0.070 7.192 
Energy 0.167 2.942 -25.034 13.011 0.077 8.660 
Financials 0.186 3.537 -23.702 33.851 0.092 12.517 
Utilities 0.093 2.257 -20.236 8.315 0.059 5.094 
Catastrophe 0.555 0.671 0.000 3.000 0.017 0.450 
CPI 2.474 1.303 -2.100 6.300 0.034 1.699 
Unem. R 5.989 1.553 3.800 10.000 0.041 2.403 
GDP 2.435 2.423 -8.200 7.800 0.063 5.857 
PMI 52.092 4.757 34.500 61.400 0.124 22.630 
Mortgage Apps 0.666 11.235 -40.500 112.100 0.294 126.217 
Property Damage 22.694 176.414 0.000 4987.000 4.623 501.483 
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TABLE 2 
Variable Correlation Matrices by Index or Sector 
Table 2 – Panel A: Correlation Matrix for S&P500 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables S&P 500 Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI Mort. Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
S&P 500 1        
Catastrophe 0.009 1       
CPI -0.059 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.022 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.018 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.037 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.019 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.011 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
 
Table 2 – Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Dow Jones Industrial Average 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables DOW Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI Mort. Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
DOW 1        
Catastrophe -0.043 1       
CPI -0.039 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.008 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.025 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.034 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.068 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.011 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
 
Table 2 – Panel C: Correlation Matrix for Nasdaq 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Nasdaq Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI Mort. Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Nasdaq 1        
Catastrophe -0.017 1       
CPI -0.051 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.026 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.007 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.025 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.036 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.007 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
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Table 2 – Panel D: Correlation Matrix for Russell 2000 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Russell 2000 Catastrophe CPI 
Unem. 
R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Russell 2000 1        
Catastrophe -0.041 1       
CPI -0.041 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.032 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.003 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.028 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.025 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
 
Table 2 – Panel E: Correlation Matrix for Consumer Discretionary Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Consumer Disc. Catastrophe CPI 
Unem. 
R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Consumer Disc. 1        
Catastrophe -0.015 1       
CPI -0.059 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.041 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.001 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.006 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.025 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.012 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
 
Table 2 – Panel F: Correlation Matrix for Consumer Staples Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Consumer Staples. Catastrophe CPI 
Unem. 
R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Consumer Stap. 1        
Catastrophe -0.039 1       
CPI -0.0008 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.015 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP -0.0008 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.008 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.039 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.012 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
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Table 2 – Panel G: Correlation Matrix for Energy Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Energy Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Energy 1        
Catastrophe -0.007 1       
CPI -0.012 0.138 1      
Unemployment -0.002 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.017 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.051 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.072 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.034 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
 
Table 2 – Panel H: Correlation Matrix for Technology Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Tech Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Technology 1        
Catastrophe -0.015 1       
CPI -0.049 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.008 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.012 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.031 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.031 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.011 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
 
Table 2 – Panel I: Correlation Matrix for Financials Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Financials Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Financials 1        
Catastrophe -0.019 1       
CPI -0.041 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.013 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.041 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.019 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps 0.003 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage -0.002 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
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Table 2 – Panel J: Correlation Matrix for Utilities Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Utilities Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Utilities 1        
Catastrophe -0.004 1       
CPI -0.003 0.138 1      
Unemployment -0.002 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.035 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.048 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.041 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.023 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
Table 2 – Panel K: Correlation Matrix for Healthcare Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Healthcare Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Healthcare 1        
Catastrophe 0.009 1       
CPI -0.012 0.138 1      
Unemployment -0.005 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.003 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.009 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.044 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage -0.003 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
Table 2 – Panel L: Correlation Matrix for Industrials Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Industrials Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Industrials 1        
Catastrophe -0.041 1       
CPI -0.039 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.016 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.027 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.041 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps -0.054 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property damage 0.005 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
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Table 2 – Panel M: Correlation Matrix for Materials Sector 
All Samples n=1,456 
Variables Materials Catastrophe CPI Unem. R GDP PMI 
Mort. 
Apps 
Prop. 
Damage 
Materials 1        
Catastrophe -0.031 1       
CPI -0.035 0.138 1      
Unemployment 0.013 -0.021 -0.199 1     
GDP 0.033 0.020 0.080 -0.729 1    
PMI 0.031 -0.023 -0.011 -0.280 0.538 1   
Mortgage Apps 0.006 -0.014 0.012 0.035 -0.002 -0.056 1  
Property 
damage -0.003 0.114 0.032 0.081 -0.064 0.031 -0.018 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
27 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Empirical Results: Fixed Effects Empirical Method 
Dependent Variable: S&P500 Index returns 
n=18,928 
Regular   
(robust)   
Fixed 
Effects 
(robust)   
Independent Variables (1)   (2)   
Intercept -0.158 ** -0.148  
 (0.336)  (0.027)  
Catastrophe -0.066 ** -0.067 ** 
 (0.028)  (0.003)  
CPI -0.063 *** -0.063 *** 
 (0.018)  (0.002)  
Unemployment Rate 0.019  0.019  
 (0.013)  (0.001)  
GDP 0.019 * 0.019 * 
 (0.011)  (0.001)  
PMI 0.007  0.007  
 (0.006)  (0.001)  
Mortgage Applications -0.007 ** -0.008 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  
Property Damage 0.000 *** 0.000 * 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Other Control Variables  NO  NO  
Entity Dummy Variables NO  YES  
R-Square 0.033  0.036  
F(7, 18928) 7.6 F(19,18928) 3.6  
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
 ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Empirical Results: OLS by Sector 
Table 4 – Panel A: Dependent Variable: Dow Jones Industrial Average 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.253 0.384 0.357 0.234 -0.165 -0.041 0.025 
 0.074 0.127 0.278 0.303 0.763 0.962 0.960 
Catastrophe -0.1422* -0.127 -0.127 -0.128 -0.127 -0.131 -0.135 
 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.084 
CPI  -0.056 -0.055 -0.056 -.0526 -.052 -.054 
  0.044 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.051 0.052 
Unemployment Rate   0.004 0.015 0.010 0.012 0.008 
   0.038 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.038 
GDP    0.025 0.015 0.018 0.023 
    0.025 0.030 0.032 0.031 
PMI     0.008 0.006 0.005 
     0.018 0.017 0.018 
Mortgage Applications     -0.013 -0.013 
      0.009 0.008 
Property Damage      0.000 
       0.001 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.009 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable.    
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Panel B: Dependent Variable: S&P 500 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.148 0.389 0.296 0.158 -0.329 -0.295 -0.280 
 0.076 0.130 0.284 0.310 0.779 1.048 1.050 
Catastrophe 0.030 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.051 
 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.088 
CPI  -0.103** -0.100* -0.102** -.097** -.097* -0.098* 
  0.453 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.055 0.055 
Unemployment Rate   0.014 0.026 0.021 0.021 0.020 
   0.039 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.041 
GDP    0.028 0.016 0.017 0.015 
    0.025 0.031 0.034 0.034 
PMI     0.010 0.010 0.010 
     0.015 0.019 0.019 
Mortgage Applications     -0.004 -0.034 
      0.008 0.008 
Property Damage       0.000 
       0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.016 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable.     
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel C: Dependent Variable: Nasdaq 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.272 0.532 0.328 0.218 -0.233 -0.141 -0.101 
 0.102 0.175 0.384 0.418 1.050 1.315 1.321 
Catastrophe -0.071 -0.041 -0.041 -0.042 -0.041 -0.044 -0.051 
 0.118 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.118 0.116 0.116 
CPI  -0.112* -0.104* -0.105* -0.101 -0.101 -0.104 
  0.061 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.061 0.062 
Unemployment Rate   0.031 0.041 0.036 0.036 0.035 
   0.052 0.054 0.055 0.058 0.058 
GDP    0.022 0.011 0.013 0.013 
    0.034 0.042 0.046 0.046 
PMI     0.010 0.008 0.007 
     0.020 0.024 0.024 
Mortgage Applications     -0.009 -0.009 
      0.010 0.010 
Property Damage       0.000 
       0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable     
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel D: Dependent Variable: Russell 2000 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.284 0.457 0.156 0.106 -0.638 -0.580 0.533 
 0.094 0.161 0.352 0.383 0.963 1.248 1.250 
Catastrophe -0.169 -0.149 -0.149 -0.150 -0.148 -0.149 -0.155 
 0.108 0.109 0.109 0.108 0.109 0.099 0.100 
CPI  -0.074 -0.064 -0.064 -0.057 -.056 -.0606 
  0.056 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.065 0.065 
Unemployment Rate   0.046 0.050 0.042 0.042 0.040 
   0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.056 
GDP    0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
    0.031 0.038 0.042 0.042 
PMI     0.015 0.015 0.014 
     0.019 0.023 0.023 
Mortgage Applications     -0.006 -0.006 
      0.012 0.123 
Property Damage      0.000 
       0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable     
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel E: Dependent Variable: Consumer Discretionary Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.234 0.513 0.164 0.091 0.459 0.517 0.579 
 0.091 0.155 0.341 0.372 0.018 1.235 1.241 
Catastrophe -0.062 -0.030 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 -0.034 -0.039 
 0.105 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.101 0.102 
CPI  -0.120** -0.107* -0.108* -0.111** -0.111* -0.114* 
  0.054 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.064 0.065 
Unemployment Rate   0.053 0.060 0.064 0.065 0.062 
   0.046 0.047 0.049 0.048 0.048 
GDP    0.015 0.024 0.025 0.026 
    0.030 0.037 0.040 0.040 
PMI     -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 
     0.018 0.023 0.023 
Mortgage Applications     -0.006 -0.006 
      0.013 0.013 
Property Damage      0.000 
       0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable 
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Panel F: Dependent Variable: Consumer Staples Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.238 0.217 0.078 0.074 -0.117 -0.048 0.014 
 0.067 0.114 0.251 0.274 0.688 0.796 0.800 
Catastrophe -0.115 -0.117 -0.118 -0.118 -0.117 -0.120 -0.125 
 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.076 0.077 
CPI  0.009 0.014 0.01398 .01576 .0159 .0125 
  0.040 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.045 
Unemployment Rate   0.021 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.019 
   0.034 0.035 0.036 0.031 0.031 
GDP    0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 
    0.022 0.027 0.028 0.028 
PMI     0.004 0.003 0.002 
     0.013 0.015 0.015 
Mortgage Applications     -0.007 -0.007 
 
     0.006 0.006 
Property Damage       0.000 
 
      0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable     
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel G: Dependent Variable: Energy Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.185 0.246 0.296 0.201 -1.533 -1.358 -0.122 
 0.100 0.171 0.375 0.409 1.020 1.342 1.349 
Catastrophe -0.033 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.023 -0.029 -0.043 
 0.115 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.109 0.109 
CPI  -0.026 -0.028 -0.029 -0.013 -.0121 -.0156 
  0.059 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.070 0.070 
Unemployment Rate   -0.008 0.001 -0.019 -0.017 -0.021 
   0.051 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.056 
GDP    0.020 -0.024 -0.020 -0.012 
    0.033 0.041 0.039 0.039 
PMI     0.037* 0.033 0.031 
     0.020 0.025 0.025 
Mortgage Applications     -0.018* -0.018* 
      0.011 0.011 
Property Damage      0.001** 
       0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.009 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable     
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel H: Dependent Variable: Technology Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.293 0.577 0.594 0.480 -0.339 -0.248 -0.173 
 0.117 0.199 0.438 0.477 1.199 1.474 1.480 
Catastrophe -0.074 -0.040 -0.041 -0.042 -0.040 -0.043 -0.051 
 0.134 0.135 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.138 
CPI  -0.122* -0.122* -0.124* -.1162 -.115* -0.121 
  0.069 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.068 0.068 
Unemployment Rate   -0.002 0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
   0.059 0.062 0.063 0.061 0.061 
GDP    0.023 0.003 0.005 0.008 
    0.039 0.048 0.049 0.050 
PMI     0.017 0.016 0.014 
     0.023 0.027 0.027 
Mortgage Applications     -0.009 -0.009 
      0.010 0.009 
Property Damage      0.000 
 
      0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable    
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel I: Dependent Variable: Financials Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.245 0.495 0.393 0.049 0.715 0.704 0.746 
 0.120 0.206 0.450 0.490 1.232 1.714 1.719 
Catastrophe -0.106 -0.076 -0.077 -0.079 -0.081 -0.080 -0.078 
 0.138 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.130 0.130 
CPI  -0.108 -0.104 -0.107 -0.113 -0.113 -0.116 
  0.072 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.099 0.100 
Unemployment Rate   0.016 0.046 0.054 0.053 0.048 
   0.070 0.063 0.065 0.059 0.059 
GDP    0.070* 0.087* 0.087 0.089 
    0.040 0.045 0.064 0.064 
PMI     -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 
     0.024 0.030 0.030 
Mortgage Applications     0.001 0.006 
      0.021 0.021 
Property Damage      0.000 
       0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable    
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Panel J: Dependent Variable: Utilities Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.099 0.105 0.136 -0.029 -0.961 -0.883 -0.801 
 0.077 0.131 0.288 0.313 0.787 1.001 1.005 
Catastrophe -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.013 -0.023 
 0.088 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.087 0.087 
CPI  -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.003 .0036 -.0007 
  0.045 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.050 0.050 
Unemployment Rate   -0.005 0.010 -0.001 0.001 -0.017 
   0.039 0.040 0.041 0.037 0.036 
GDP    0.034 0.011 0.013 0.016 
    0.025 0.031 0.032 0.032 
PMI     0.020 0.018 0.017 
     0.015 0.019 0.019 
Mortgage Applications     -0.008 -0.007 
 
     0.007 0.007 
Property Damage       0.003 
 
      0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable     
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel K: Dependent Variable: Healthcare Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.191 0.250 0.307 0.312 0.077 0.164 0.174 
 0.082 0.140 0.307 0.335 0.841 0.986 0.992 
Catastrophe 0.028 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.033 0.038 
 0.094 0.095 0.095 0.062 0.095 0.093 0.094 
CPI  -0.025 -0.027 -0.027 -0.025 -.0248 -.025 
  0.049 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.052 0.052 
Unemployment Rate   -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 
   0.042 0.043 0.044 0.039 0.040 
GDP    -0.001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 
    0.027 0.033 0.034 0.034 
PMI     0.005 0.003 0.003 
     0.016 0.018 0.019 
Mortgage Applications     -0.009 -0.009 
 
     0.008 0.008 
Property Damage      -0.001 
 
      0.002 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable     
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel L: Dependent Variable: Industrials Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.269 0.428 0.295 0.124 -0.505 -0.390 -0.330 
 0.088 0.151 0.331 0.360 0.905 1.170 1.179 
Catastrophe -0.162 -0.144 -0.144 -0.145 -0.143 -0.148 -0.147 
 0.101 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.096 0.097 
CPI  -0.068 -0.063 -0.065 -.0588 -.058 -0.062 
  0.052 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.064 0.064 
Unemployment Rate   0.020 0.035 0.028 0.029 0.024 
   0.045 0.046 0.047 0.050 0.050 
GDP    0.035 0.019 0.022 0.026 
    0.029 0.036 0.041 0.042 
PMI     0.013 0.011 0.010 
     0.018 0.021 0.021 
Mortgage Applications     -0.012 -0.012 
 
     0.011 0.011 
Property Damage      0.000 
 
      0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable    
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel M: Dependent Variable: Materials Sector 
n=1,456        
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.142 0.285 0.203 -0.020 -0.154 -0.169 -0.146 
 0.091 0.156 0.341 0.371 0.934 1.103 1.109 
Catastrophe -0.123 -0.106 -0.106 -0.107 -0.108 -0.107 -0.108 
 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.103 0.103 
CPI  -0.061 -0.058 -0.060 -.0590 -.059 -.0618 
  0.054 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.057 
Unemployment Rate   0.012 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.029 
   0.046 0.048 0.049 0.042 0.043 
GDP    0.046 0.042 0.042 0.043 
    0.030 0.037 0.039 0.040 
PMI     0.003 0.003 0.003 
     0.018 0.021 0.021 
Mortgage Applications     0.001 0.002 
 
     0.012 0.012 
Property Damage      0.000 
 
      0.000 
Other Control Variables NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Square 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Notes: Standard errors are shown under respective variable    
***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Websites where Data was Collected. 
https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/map  
www.finance.yahoo.com 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/earthq4/severitygip.html 
http://www.spc.noaa.gov/climo/torn/STAMTS14.txt 
http://weather.unisys.com/hurricane/index.php 
https://weather.com/storms/tornado/news/enhanced-fujita-scale-20130206 
 
 
